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ABSTRACT 
This study adopts a multilevel comparative approach to investigating the degree to 
which Japanese work systems are implemented and internalized in the UK business 
system. The focus is on the limits to accepting continuous improvement schemes of 
Japanese multinational corporations. The paper addresses national and local 
institutional factors and firm-level organizational factors affecting implementation and 
internalization.  It is based on in-depth case studies systematically comparing the 
adoption of Japanese work systems in two UK subsidiaries and in an Anglo-
Japanese technical collaboration. The study concludes that firms face a double 
barrier to the internalization of work systems in the form of, first, institutional 
embeddedness at national and local level, and second, embeddedness of tacit work 
systems at firm level. Firms attempt locally to interpret work systems transferred from 
the source company.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 1960s there was a widely-held view that the diffusion of manufacturing 
technologies and divisions of labour at the societal level would eventually lead to 
convergence in institutional arrangements (cf. Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). However, 
despite increasing international integration of production and markets, institutional 
harmonization across nations has not occurred. It is commonly believed, especially among 
advocates of the ‘lean production’ perspective (e.g. Womack et al., 1990), that there is an 
optimum solution for organizing labour, raw materials and capital in the manufacture and 
distribution of goods, and this in turn implies a set of ‘best practices’ for organizing work 
systems cross-nationally. Within this perspective, the focus has been primarily on the 
conditions for the successful diffusion of work systems. Such systems are conceptualized as 
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comprising modules of practices that can be disassembled, encapsulated in ‘actionable 
consulting packages and “how to” books’ (Lillrank, 1995: 976) and transplanted to another 
context.  
Another, more recent, body of research has adopted a more integrated understanding 
of the way in which work systems are socially constituted and how this influences the 
possibility of diffusing work systems to other national contexts (Abo, 1994; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld et al., 1998; Kostova, 1999). For example, there is much research reporting on 
the local adoption of diffused ‘Japanese’ work systems, where the result is far from being a 
replica of these systems (e.g. Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992; Elger and Smith, 1994).  
In the light of the current state of the literature, the present study aims to explore how 
institutional peculiarities hinder the implementation and internalization of Japanese work 
systems in the UK. The introduction of ‘new’ work systems by management at the adopter 
firm is labelled here the ‘implementation process’ and is evident in formal mechanisms such 
as training programmes. The ‘internalization process’ refers to the routinization or 
institutionalization of work systems by workers and is evident in the attitudes of workers to 
diffused systems. More specifically, the internalization process refers to the acceptance and 
approval by employees of a practice that is infused with value (Kostova, 1999). The study 
adopts a process-oriented perspective to looking at the underlying reasons for the difficulties 
encountered in the diffusion of work systems from highly institutionalized contexts to those 
of lower institutionalization. It investigates not only structural contingencies but also the role 
of people in blending and redesigning work systems. The study examines the barriers to the 
internalization of alternative work systems by drawing on the historical neo-institutional 
perspective.  
The following section discusses the peculiarities of each national-institutional context 
and assesses how far the institutional differences between Japan and Britain hinder the 
diffusion of work systems. Research methods and data analysis are discussed in the third 
section. The fourth reports the findings on what is diffused and the extent to which it is 
accepted in the adopter companies. The discussion in the fifth section uses a systematic 
comparison of cases to highlight the characteristics that are critical to the firms’ 
internalization of work systems. In the final section, the role of actors in the translation and 
editing of work systems is discussed, and the implications of the findings for other business 
systems and sectors are presented. 
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Peculiarities of the Japanese and UK National Business Systems 
 
The theoretical perspective of this paper is informed by the historical neo-institutionalist view 
in which economic activity is seen as embedded in and shaped by a particular set of 
institutional arrangements (cf. Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Social relationships and the 
collective norms that mould them are examined in relation to their structural and historical 
underpinnings (Djelic, 1999). The ‘divergent capitalisms’ framework pays systematic 
attention to the influence of social institutions. Differences in dominant forms of governance 
or key macro-level institutions, such as the public training system, are seen as shaping 
different forms of business systems (Whitley, 1996). Managerial co-ordination and work 
organization within the firm reflect the institutional context in which it is embedded. Thus 
when firms extend their operations into new institutional contexts, they are highly likely to 
adapt their existing structures and cultures. This paper demonstrates that this is especially the 
case in Anglo-Japanese operations, given the wide disparity in institutional arrangements 
between Japan and the UK. The highly co-ordinated business system of Japan in which 
institutional co-operation is a key feature of organizational logic differs from the 
compartmentalized UK system in which dominant institutions discourage co-operation 
between business partners, including employers and employees.  
The presumed advantage in commitment and motivation enjoyed by Japanese 
manufacturers over their ‘western’ counterparts rests on a distinctive set of organizational 
structures and employment systems (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). The internal labour 
market allows for greater informal participation in decisions compared with western plants. 
The collectivist values and tightly-knit networks encourage low strike activity, absenteeism 
and turnover (see Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, for a historical analysis). The norms governing 
trust and authority relations promote close links between superordinates and subordinates, 
‘with reciprocal services expected of superiors through direct patronage’ (Whitley, 1999a: 52) 
and low reward differentials. Such relations encourage skills development. These skills are 
typically firm-specific and highly tacit owing to an ‘experience’ model of education, 
encompassing in-house training and job rotation and long-term commitments (Dore and Sako, 
1997). The Japanese system of corporate management is seen as creating employment 
stability, flexible personnel policies and strong employee identification with the company, 
and as encouraging participative, hands-on management, commitment to continuous 
improvement activities and teamwork (e.g. McMillan, 1996).  
By contrast, compartmentalized business systems encourage reliance on formal rules 
and procedures that facilitate delegation, rather than on social networks and high 
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interdependency. Relations between actors are seen as arm’s-length and typically 
adversarial.Strike activity, absenteeism and turnover have traditionally been expected 
occurrences (Lane, 1996). Employment security in Britain is typically low; this is connected 
with lower investment in skills development by UK firms and the absence of a tradition of 
life-time relationships between employees and firms (Sako, 1992).  
Given their strong embeddedness in a network of mutual obligations and 
commitment, firms in highly co-ordinated systems ‘find it difficult to shift key activities and 
significant resources to foreign locations’ (Whitley, 1999b: 12). Thus, it can be argued that 
the diffusion of work systems is more difficult where they are embedded in highly co-
ordinated business systems.  
Against this background, the study investigates the diffusion of continuous 
improvement schemes from Japan to the UK. It assesses the degree to which UK adopter 
firms implement and internalize a model of work organization in which employees participate 
through teams; and the extent of employee and management commitment to quality 
improvement schemes. It also examines Japanese involvement in strategic decisions and 
operations, as well as hands-on management in the adopter company. The study highlights the 
interrelation between largely tangible, explicit knowledge often embodied in formal 
structures, and more intangible, tacit knowledge embodied in management--worker relations 
within the firm.  
The aim of the paper is thus to examine work systems in their institutional context 
and their diffusion to a less regulated and less densely institutionalized environment. Both 
institutional and organizational levels are addressed in an effort to consider the contextual 
embeddedness of alternative work systems (see figure 1).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The extent to which the underlying principles of continuous improvement practices 
are implemented and internalized can differ across firms within the same sector. This is 
explored through a comparative study of affiliate firms -- two subsidiaries and a partner firm -
- of three Japanese MNCs in the UK. 
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Research Methods and Sites 
 
The study systematically compares three cases -- Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-
Honda collaboration -- to highlight the conditions for the implementation and internalization 
of Japanese work systems. It draws on interviews with Japanese advisors, directors, UK team 
leaders, operators, electrical engineers, and managers across personnel and training, sales and 
marketing, product engineering, design and quality, finance, purchasing, logistics operations, 
the liaison office and manufacturing integration in the UK sites. One week’s factory work 
experience in two of the UK sites provided complementary data and in particular enabled the 
researcher to be sensitive to the context-dependent nature of diffused work systems. 
Information was also gathered through factory tours and interviews with Japanese electrical 
engineers and managers in international operations, product development, general affairs, 
quality assurance, corporate finance, engineering, corporate planning and control, and design 
departments in Japan. The research methods employed in the three firms are detailed in table 
1.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The field research draws on open-ended and semi-structured interviews conducted 
between August 1998 and April 2000 on the incorporation of Japanese continuous 
improvement techniques (operationalized as team-based work or change in authority 
relations) and philosophies (operationalized as the values of a team ethos and 
personal/cultural control) into the UK adopter firms. Information was sought on the meaning 
for individuals of events, relationships, social structures, roles and norms. Data on the degree 
of internalization were obtained from field observations and on-the-job discussions with the 
operators. The quotes in the findings and discussion sections are based on verbatim 
transcripts.  
The degree of ‘internalization’ was measured as high where operators perceived value 
in the diffused practice, put their trust in the system and accepted it with little resistance. The 
interest was in highlighting the conditions underlying this level of acceptance and how it 
varied across the sampled firms. In other words, how close did the UK adopters come to 
understanding the original meaning of the diffused practices as found in the Japanese source 
companies? The assumption here was that the original meaning of these practices could be 
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understood and internalized where adopters were able to perceive value in the diffused 
practices and accept them with little resistance.   
A ‘method of difference’ was adopted for comparing cases with different degrees of 
internalization of Japanese work systems. The objective was to track down regularities in 
patterns of conditions that, at least in part, accounted for common outcomes, and, by 
comparing divergent cases, to identify ‘bundles of conditions’ that were responsible for 
variations in outcomes (cf. Djelic, 1998: 15, based on John Stuart Mill’s two-sided 
comparative method).  
The research sites were selected to include a brownfield and a greenfield subsidiary, 
and a technical collaboration site. The aim was to cover a range of organizational contexts 
likely to influence the way in which practices were implemented and internalized. The 
brownfield site, Teniki UK (a pseudonym), had been owned by a British firm before being 
acquired by a Japanese car component manufacturer, Teniki, in 1996. Employing 170 people 
in 1999, it is located in a centre for tourism, where a large proportion of the labour force 
(nearly 40 per cent in 1997) is employed in the public sector. Teniki UK’s senior management 
was replaced with a more market-oriented, quality-conscious team upon its acquisition. Since 
1996, six Japanese advisors have been brought in to Teniki UK from the parent company. 
They act as technical experts in the technical and development, operations, sales and 
marketing areas, avoiding positions of direct control in the management hierarchy. The 
people side of management is left to local managers. 
The greenfield case company, Nissera UK (also a pseudonym), was founded in 1988 
as part of a strategy to serve major Japanese customers in Europe. It is located in an area in 
which manufacturing accounts for nearly 40 per cent of jobs. The company employed 300 
people in 1999. The composition of the senior management team changed in the years after its 
foundation from 60 per cent Japanese employees initially to the current 6 per cent. Twelve 
Japanese managers -- two senior directors, eight managers in engineering and two managers 
in the financial area -- serve liaison roles between the subsidiary and the parent company. The 
production managers and supervisors are predominantly British and recruited locally.  
[Repetition of what is stated on page 9]The Rover--Honda Collaboration is the 
technical collaboration site. The strategic alliance was formed in 1978. The Rover Group was 
looking for a partner to help restructure its organization and to remedy the lack of new 
projects, whilst Honda wanted to increase its sales volume in Europe. At the start of the 
collaboration, the two companies had comparable sales volumes. However, Honda was 
profitable and growing rapidly while Rover was loss-making and some of its previous 
projects had damaged the company’s image. The study focuses on the collaboration over the 
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Rover 200/Honda Concerto (coded the R8/YY), as this constituted ‘side-by-side’ work rather 
than an arm’s-length relationship, reflecting the similarity in the two companies’ goals and 
the learning from the previous collaborative project. The R8/YY project was seen by Rover 
engineers and senior managers as the most successful project in terms of the degree of 
collaboration, quality and process improvement, problem resolution and learning benefits (cf. 
Mair, 1998). It was also a turning point for Rover in financial terms, marking the initiation of 
structural and cultural change and replacing a core product line.  
 
 
Findings 
 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover faced similar environmental pressures to be innovative and 
competitive. They aimed to enhance manufacturing skills and the quality and productivity of 
their output by adopting lean manufacturing systems and continuous improvement. However, 
conscious efforts to institutionalize meanings, values and norms at these sites were not very 
effective in changing organizational behaviour. Although the major practices diffused were 
similar in all three companies, the degree to which they were infused with value and accepted 
in each site differed. The degree of implementation and internalization of work systems was 
significantly higher at Nissera UK and the Rover--Honda collaboration than at Teniki UK.  
 
 
The Shift to Team Structure: The Change in Authority Relations  
 
There was a shift in work organization at all three sites towards a flatter team structure. The 
pattern of authority relations at the two subsidiaries was changed from one based on 
superintendents, supervisors and hourly-paid workers to one built around team leaders, team 
coaches and hourly-paid workers arranged in a production cell layout rather than assembly 
lines. At Rover, there was a shift from functional authority relations to a project-based 
structure in 1985. Formerly, Rover allocated resources to different functions, with individuals 
working on a number of projects. A core expertise could not be sustained within such a 
structure. By contrast, within a project-based structure, engineers who were assigned to 
project teams could consult a central pool of expertise on technical difficulties.  
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The shift in authority relations had an impact on worker response to diffused work 
systems. Although operators at both subsidiary firms were cynical about the structural shift, 
those at Nissera UK were more successful in adopting a team-based structure. Similarly, 
Rover engineers working on the R8/YY project were relatively successful in effecting a 
transition to a project-based organization.  
At Teniki UK, the segregation between management and workers led to difficulties in 
instilling high levels of commitment among operators. Team-working was better received by 
operators in Nissera UK, where the shift to a team structure in 1997 was associated with the 
build-up of skills imparted by Japanese expatriates in the early years after the company’s 
establishment. However, the fluid job descriptions evident in the Japanese parent companies 
were not widely observed in the UK subsidiaries. Operators perceived team leaders as above 
the work group rather than as members of the team: ‘We had less number of supervisors, 
hence it was a cost-saving measure in that way. We had a lot who did not understand the 
difference between a team coach and a supervisor’ (British personnel and training assistant, 
Teniki UK). Team leaders and assistants at Nissera UK had clearly defined responsibilities 
and their positions were treated as managerial ones. This is reflected in the production 
manager’s claim that ‘team leaders do not do the work. As long as they make sure the system 
is in, what comes out is efficiency, cost and quality’.  
At Rover, the project-based structure adopted with R8/YY was seen as promoting a 
team effort to solve problems quickly and deliver projects on time. Nevertheless, from 
Honda’s perspective the implementation of the project-based structure at Rover was not 
effectively carried out -- functional managers continued to have more control than project 
managers. Honda continued to uphold a project-based structure:  
We always have a weekly meeting with every project leader. Rover had a problem, 
because its body engineers were in Cowley, interior engineers in Canley and other 
engineers in Longbridge. They tried to gather and established Gaydon [where the 
design centre is].  
 (Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe)  
While communication then improved, the timing of the build phases still could not match that 
of Honda:  
We agreed on a schedule. Rover could not understand this schedule, could not 
understand how to manage or carry out their own job. Honda sets up a project 
manager to manage the timing. They control the progress of the team. They also 
receive the services of a support function.  
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(Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe) 
 
 
Commitment to Quality Improvement Schemes 
 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover all had difficulty in securing commitment of all parties to 
parent companies’ continuous improvement schemes, such as quality circles, discipline in the 
workplace and the  ‘5C’ housekeeping principles (classifying, clarifying, cleanliness, clean-up 
and custom).  
Operators and those enforcing the system at Teniki UK did not ascribe to the 
Japanese belief that good housekeeping improves work habits and quality of facilities. For 
instance, ‘people do not read the quality audits. They just put a check. Somebody at the end of 
the day should look at the sheets’ (senior operator in air element at Teniki UK). Older 
workers at Teniki UK worked according to their own rules and enjoyed the freedom created 
by weak control in the factory. They manhandled machines when they did not work properly, 
ate and drank in their cells, and failed to fill in production timesheets on an hourly basis: ‘I do 
it at the end of the day and take an average. It looks better that way’. Production pressures led 
to the manipulation of scrap rate figures. An assembler commented: ‘Quality Assurance is 
called over when there is a supplier-related problem. If there is a pressure to get the order out, 
then they will pass the item that I would normally scrap’. (However, a team coach at Teniki 
commented that the Japanese also manipulated their scrap rates.) The Teniki UK operations 
manager summarized the situation in the plant as follows: 
The biggest thing, which we have not been successful in, I suppose, is the 
Kaizen, small group activity work. We all know the benefits of doing that but 
again, the managers and engineers can actually carry on these activities, but 
unless the people on the shop floor buy into them and understand them and 
want to be part of them, it is not sustainable. You can create Kaizen activity, 
get result and potentially walk away. And if the people do not buy into it and 
understand why they are doing it, it is wasted. Because we have not cascaded 
the information down and have not got the skills bottom up to top, we cannot 
achieve this sustainable continuous improvement within the plant.      
Similarly, operators at  Nissera UK failed to internalize continuous improvement schemes, 
owing to the way local management administered Kaizen initiatives:  
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We were forced to go on this course [on quality circles]. They called it ‘family 
circle’. It is a big joke. Everything is a joke. It could be better if they were 
straighter with us. As far as we are concerned, they have deceived us. They will 
start with something and if it does not suit them, they will change it.  
(Operator in cluster assembly at Nissera UK) 
The author’s own work experience in one of the production cells showed 
inconsistency in the application of quality standards. The researcher was shown how to 
conduct a quality control check on case assembly. This involved checking the strength of 
screw tightening/loosening and plotting the observed measure on a quality control chart. The 
assembler who was demonstrating the process recorded the measure as falling within the 
quality tolerance levels although the figure was clearly outside the limits. The low sense of 
responsibility for quality control processes could also be observed in the ‘parts testing’ phase 
of the assembly process. Tests on fuel and temperature indicators normally took seven 
minutes to complete. However, operators found this too long and halted the process after two 
or three minutes. 
In the early years of the Rover--Honda collaboration, there seemed to be more 
emphasis on results than on processes. Underlying philosophies were learnt over time as more 
projects of a collaborative nature were carried out. The commitment to quality improvement 
schemes in car development was low until 1985. With the initiation of the R8/YY project, 
there was a step improvement in the level of commitment to such schemes. The dedication 
was even higher on subsequent projects, particularly with the launch of the Rover 200 model 
in 1989. On the whole, continuous improvement schemes were fully implemented but only 
partly internalized by Rover engineers.  
For example, Honda’s gebba-kai process was approximated and never fully realized. 
The gebba-kai process basically consisted of one or two days set aside in a project after a 
build sequence to iron out problems, to do, for example, with parts not fitting properly or with 
misunderstandings between engineering and manufacturing. Suppliers were also invited to 
these meetings where problems could not be resolved internally. Rover engineers were able to 
observe the gebba-kai process during their 6-12 months’ joint engineering work with Honda 
engineers in Japan.  
While gebba-kai was seen as valuable by Rover -- ‘they forced us to use it but since 
they have left we have still used it’ (team leader) -- implementation differed from Honda 
practice. Although the intention was to have an internal and an external gebba-kai as at 
Honda, Rover had ‘changed it a little bit for the worst’ (British senior manager in 
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manufacturing integration), with fewer days devoted to it and fewer people attending problem 
resolution sessions. The gebba-kai meetings failed to see things through to decisions.  
The aim is to always arrive at a decision. I think if we followed it [gebba-kai] literally 
and the way some of the Honda engineers worked, then yes, we would always arrive 
at a decision because they would not leave without a decision.  
(Rover design and development engineer)  
Thus there was an ‘editing’ of the work system once Honda members were not 
directly involved in its implementation. This was seen as reflecting the influence of people 
who had not been to Japan to see how the process worked. As UK-resident engineers had not 
had the experience of working ‘side-by-side’ with the Japanese, they could not relate to the 
concerns of the engineers based in Japan:  
They obviously had other projects to work on. So I was saying no, forget about the 
other projects and give me the answer in the R8 project now, please. I would plead 
with them, and bribe them and use different carrots and sticks….  
(Rover team leader) 
      Rover engineers tended to apply processes as they saw fit. ‘I think we tend to look 
for compromise and modify as appropriate or we feel we have to because we have money 
constraints’ (principal systems engineer at Rover). Honda members were perceived by Rover 
engineers as following instructions to the letter: ‘The Japanese always comply with their 
orders. We will comply if the orders suit us’ (principal systems engineer at Rover). By 
contrast, employees in the UK context would try to find an alternative method of carrying out 
a task rather than work to a rigid process. According to a senior manager in manufacturing 
integration, Rover lacked the self-discipline to rigorously prove a process, train people and 
introduce double checks to stabilize the system. This was observed in the way Rover raised 
Project Change Requests (PCRs).  
Again we might not have the discipline that they adopt in terms of the PCR 
changes. PCRs are supposed to be all resolved and signed off at the [gebba-kai] 
event. But not everybody turns up. Sometimes it is quite difficult to judge 
whether you should invite all your suppliers, because some of our suppliers 
come a long way. So we might not have the discipline to fully do it but we still 
basically adopt it.  
(Principal Electrical Engineer at Rover) 
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Degree of Involvement by the Japanese 
 
Although the extent to which Japanese expatriates were involved in the day-to-day running of 
the business and in manpower planning differs across the three cases, the pressure exerted by 
the Japanese company on technical and strategic issues was considerable in the two subsidiary 
firms. At Teniki UK, there was high indirect involvement by Japanese management in the 
activities of the subsidiary. There was considerable financial pressure from the parent 
company, in terms of demands for rapid profitability, despite the parent’s interest in 
developing skills at the UK operation.  
The way the company development has been financed has restricted [the 
adoption of Japanese practice]. Japanese normally take a very long-term view in 
any investment. They are always for the future. For some reason, the way this 
business has been financed is through short-term loans instead of a large-share 
capital by the parent company. And the request has been that we make a very 
quick return on the investment whereas normally you would have maybe a few 
years’ grace.   
(Operations manager at Teniki UK [is this manager in UK or Japan HQ?? He is 
in the UK as indicated by ‘Teniki UK’. The parent company in Japan is labelled 
Teniki (without the ‘UK’)])  
The type of control exercised was impersonal/technocratic through output control and 
planning with clear-cut quantitative objectives at both strategic and operational levels. 
Similarly, the parent of Nissera UK was heavily involved in decisions on providing 
technology and investment finance for the subsidiary. However, Nissera did not exert 
stringent budgetary control over the UK firm, at least in the first three years of operation. 
Instead, it exercised personal/cultural control through direct supervision and the use of 
expatriates: 
Sometimes we do not chase profit. Otherwise we would be money traders. 
We invest. Our profit is generated from the products we manufacture. We 
sometimes try to forget about profitability. For the first three years, we do not 
expect a profit. We expect a profit in the fourth, fifth year.  
(Manager in corporate planning and control department at Nissera [assume 
this is a Japanese manager in Japan, so HQ added for clarity, OK?? Yes, this 
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is a Japanese manager in Japan but ‘Nissera’ without the ‘UK’ refers to the 
HQ. ‘Nissera UK’ refers to the subsidiary in the UK. ])  
As at Teniki, the responsibility for design rested with the parent company, and the subsidiary 
operated more as an assembly operation dependent on imports of manufactured inputs from 
Japan (cf. Elger and Smith, 1994). 
At Rover, the pressure by [**seems to make more sense than ‘pressure by’ – or do 
you mean ‘pressure by local JAPANESE management’? No, even though there was an 
element of this. I was told that Rover executives encouraged engineers to work to Honda 
standards] local management on engineers to follow the ‘Honda’ way in design and 
development became apparent during the R8/YY project: ‘As the project went on, we were 
more and more subtly encouraged to go the Honda way on everything. In essence, we adopted 
our specifications to meet theirs at the end of the day’ (principal electrical engineer at Rover). 
Nevertheless, as Rover was not wholly owned by Honda, Honda’s exercise of control did not 
take the form of direct supervision as in the other two firms. At Rover, personal/cultural 
control was exercised more through socialization, informal communication and management 
training.    
The findings at the three companies on the nature of diffused work systems are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Discussion: explaining the patterns of implementation and 
internalization 
 
The case study findings show that the diffusability of work systems from a highly co-
ordinated national business system such as Japan to a compartmentalized one such as the UK 
is hindered by conflicting institutional legacies and the variation in emphasis on tacit and 
explicit work systems between Japan and the UK . Work systems are seen as of high tacitness 
in Japan due to firms’ reliance on an environment of organizational learning, consensus 
decision-making and on-the-job and continuous education at the operational level. The human 
element of knowledge production is brought to the fore. However, UK managers tend to focus 
more on explicit knowledge that is relatively easy to measure, control and process.  
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As the cases indicate, there is a tendency for UK management to show interest in the 
diffusion of structure as opposed to the complex set of meanings attached to work systems. It 
is questionable to what degree local management understood the importance of intangible 
elements in continuous improvement schemes. The UK subsidiaries seemed to have a limited 
ability to generate ‘organizational cultures involving high levels of worker commitment and 
flexibility’ (Warner, 1994: 510) to team-based organisational structures. For example, 
significant differences existed in the translation of a team structure to the British context.  
This seems partly to reflect deep differences in national-institutional arrangements 
between Britain and Japan. There is a disjunction between the demands of a system that is 
strongly embedded in a network of mutual obligations and commitment, and those of a 
system that discourages co-operation between business partners. The ability of team leaders in 
the two subsidiary firms and the project leaders at Rover to maintain good communications 
within and across teams, and to motivate operators and engineers to engage in continuous 
improvement activities, was in part influenced by the institutional variation in worker 
commitment and flexibility between Japan and the UK. Unlike in Japan, a minimum 
involvement philosophy and low worker discretion have been the tradition in the UK (Dore, 
1973). This is exemplified by the brownfield site in the study. ‘In Japan, employees are 
grateful for being given a project to do. However, in the UK, there is demarcation, 
unionization. Employees will ask “why ask me to do the project?”’ (personnel and training 
manager at Teniki UK). The resistance, especially among older Teniki UK operators, to 
alternative work systems was seen as deriving partly from the preference for traditional 
British work organization based on craft demarcations and union activity [is the presence of 
union relevant to the Teniki case? perhaps delete the phrase ‘and the presence of unions’ No, 
it is not relevant to the Teniki UK case but there is a reference here to the traditional ‘British 
model’ which is based on craft demarcation and union activity rather than Teniki UK’s 
regional setting ]. Thus a senior carbon canister assembler perceived problems in the 
diffusion of 5C housekeeping principles as resulting from different institutional processes in 
Japan and the UK: ‘it [housekeeping] is ingrained in Japan. It goes back a long way. The 
European, continental approach is different. Production, sweeping and paperwork represent 
three separate jobs’. In other words, production was carried out by the operator, sweeping by 
the apprentice and paperwork by the supervisor. 
However, the variation in outcomes among the three case-study firms implies that 
national-institutional differences cannot provide a full explanation of patterns of work 
systems diffusion. In addition, key features of the local institutional contexts, such as local 
labour market conditions, and of organizational contexts, including company characteristics, 
explain the varying degree to which alternative work systems are internalized.    
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Local Institutional Context 
 
In contrast to the findings of the Japanization literature (e.g. Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992), this 
study did not find that and [added because level of disputes is not the same as unionisation- 
OK? I do not have figures on unionization in the region, hence I would refrain from using this 
term. I would like to focus only on the level of disputes] the level of industrial disputes (in 
terms of the working days lost per 1,000 employees through strikes and stoppages) in a region 
had a significant impact on the degree of internalization of Japanese work systems. A low 
level of industrial disputes in the region in which Teniki UK is located did not facilitate the 
internalization of Japanese work systems. Similarly, high levels of industrial disputes in the 
regions in which Nissera UK and Rover are located did not impede internalization. On the 
contrary, the Teniki UK workforce displayed resistance to new methods of work despite the 
low level of industrial disputes in the area. This was due to the dominant effect of a pre-
existing culture. Education and skill levels were low at Teniki UK, reflecting the fact that it 
was located in an agricultural region without a strong manufacturing base: according to the 
personnel and training manager, 60 per cent of employees had no more than three GCSEs. 
This had a negative impact on the internalization of parent-company practices.  
The pattern of low skills in the local labour market was reinforced by government 
regional policy. State support for inward investment was low in the tourist region in which 
Teniki UK was located, whilst it was high in the location sites of Nissera UK and Rover--
Honda. This reflected government policy of allocating resources to regions most affected by 
industrial restructuring and most dependent on manufacturing (Byers, 2001). The resulting 
low inward investment in Teniki UK’s region helped maintain the low skills level of local 
labour compared with areas that received government support for investment. However, given 
that the regions with high skills in manufacturing were favourable to the adoption of 
continuous improvement schemes, a future increase in the skills level in less-developed 
regions might facilitate their adoption of manufacturing philosophies and techniques.  
This study also shows that location in a greenfield site, in association with high skills 
in manufacturing, facilitated the internalization of highly institutionalized Japanese practices, 
as the new workforce had fewer preconceptions (cf. Sharpe, 1997). Hence, a new set of work 
procedures could be introduced with less resistance. This was not necessarily related to the 
recruitment of older, experienced workers with ‘a basic work ethic of attendance, obeying 
orders and not quitting’ (Elger and Smith, 1998: 541; Hallier and Leopold, 2000). The 
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argument here is not that greenfield firms are better able to impose their practices on local 
labour market conditions. It is that organizational factors such as the attention paid by 
Japanese expatriates to the implementation of continuous improvement schemes can play a 
more prominent role than local institutional factors in the internalization process. The point to 
note is that the impact of local institutional factors on the internalization process needs to be 
considered in conjunction with that of organizational factors.  
In a brownfield site like Teniki UK, organizational inertia tends to lead to practices 
that more closely resemble local practices. To a degree this also applies to Rover--Honda. 
Strong lines of demarcation at Rover had led to the defence of job territory and challenged the 
drive towards increased flexibility in the manufacturing area. However, the engineers, on 
whom this study focuses, showed less resistance to the internalization of Japanese work 
systems owing to the different nature of their work, skills base and learning resulting from the 
previous collaborative work with Honda.  
Thus the degree of internalization of Japanese work systems tends to be high where 
there is a favourable local institutional context, characterized by high inward investment and 
location on a greenfield site [but don’t you argue two paragraphs earlier that greenfield 
location operates more as an organizational than a local-institutional factor?? I regard it as a 
local institutional factor, but feel obliged to alert the reader to the need to consider its impact 
on adoption in association with organizational factors rather than as a stand-alone factor], as 
at Nissera UK. In addition, the absence of a pre-existing culture is more conducive to the 
internalization of Japanese work systems than a non-unionized labour market. In other words, 
location in a region with a high level of industrial disputes and strong manufacturing base is 
not necessarily an obstacle to the internalization of diffused work systems where there is a 
large supply of skilled labour, as illustrated by the Rover--Honda case. In contrast to previous 
research (e.g. Elger and Smith, 1994), a large supply of unskilled workers and location in a 
tourist region (as with Teniki UK), where labour can be expected to be relatively free of 
preconceived ideas in manufacturing, do not facilitate the internalization of Japanese work 
systems. Thus the local institutional factors that are of significance here are skills levels, type 
of industrial base [‘location of the firm’ is a vague phrase here - what influencing factor does 
refer to that isn’t included in skills levels and state support? – does it mean e.g. type of 
industrial base? in which case say this directly Location of a firm, as shown in Table 3,refers 
to the ’colour’ of the site or type of industrial base ] and state support for investment. The key 
national and local institutional characteristics are summarized in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 17
 
 
Organizational Context 
 
In line with the literature (e.g. Fligstein, 1990), firms’ pre-existing strategies, structures and 
technologies shape the pattern of change towards the ‘Japanese model’. In the case-study 
companies, actual practices do not conform to the prescriptions implemented in Japan, and 
diffused work systems are renegotiated and adapted. Although all three firms found it difficult 
to develop and replicate ‘esprit de corps’, Nissera UK and Rover were relatively more 
successful in implementing a team-based structure and continuous improvement activities 
such as quality circles. In Nissera UK, the team structure had been in place for some time, the 
workforce was more skilled, and the parent company provided long-term financing. In 
contrast to Teniki UK, Japanese managers at Nissera UK offered hands-on training to older 
operators and were heavily involved in shop-floor activities. In other words, Japanese 
expatriates attempted to carry over to the UK the characteristic Japanese pattern of 
institutional co-operation encouraging investment in skills development (cf. Orrù, 1997).  
At Nissera UK, management had a strong approach to discipline until 1997, which 
marked the end of the Japanese managing director’s employment contract. The attention paid 
to the implementation of continuous improvement schemes, in addition to the availability of 
financial and human resources, meant that the level of commitment to such schemes was 
higher at Nissera UK than at Teniki UK.. [Although relevant, it is an old reference]. At 
Nissera UK, hands-on training of operators by the Japanese in the early years resembled the 
master--apprentice relationship in which ‘craft’ skills were acquired, ‘not through language 
but through observation, imitation and practice’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 63). However, 
Japanese management’s training, supervisory and advisory roles had diminished over the 
years as the phase of implementing new management systems and practices had been 
completed. Subsequently, with the replacement of Japanese expatriates by local management, 
less attention was paid to continuous improvement principles: ‘Although they had more strict 
rules, Japanese managers would help you work. They would go to the source of the problem. 
British managers make up titles and waste money’ (operator in printed circuit board 
manufacture at Nissera UK).  
Teniki UK had not yet achieved economies of scale and this put financial pressure on 
local management in its efforts to impart continuous improvement philosophies to operators. 
Moreover, 57 per cent of its parent company’s shares were held by a Japanese car 
manufacturer -- Teniki’s biggest customer . This arrangement further constrained Teniki 
 18
UK’s financial flexibility. Given its recent acquisition, the UK subsidiary had not been under 
Japanese ownership long enough to be fully imbued with a continuous improvement culture. 
The cases demonstrate that the nature of Japanese management intervention in the 
implementation of diffused work systems is crucial in shaping the internalization process. In 
particular, whether management involvement in meeting strategic and operational aims is 
hands-on or indirect, and the degree of involvement of Japanese expatriate management in 
strategic and operational decisions (including supervision on the shop floor) are factors 
influencing how the adopter firm perceives the exercise of control by the source firm. This in 
turn shapes actors’ decisions on whether or not to accept new ideas. 
In line with the arguments in the literature (e.g. Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990), large 
organizations can offer greater financial resources for the implementation and internalization 
of Japanese work systems than small organizations. For example, the Rover--Honda 
collaboration’s large size and the associated economies of scale in production allowed more 
resources to be allocated to the employee training necessary for the internalization of 
alternative work practices. By the same token, the passage of time (11 years at Nissera UK 
and Rover--Honda sites from the year of foundation to the time of data collection or project 
completion) and the experience of a previous working relationship encouraged an emphasis 
on worker training and learning. For example, the secondment of Rover engineers to Japan 
for 6-12 months, the establishment of a liaison office in 1985 and joint engineering team 
meetings with Honda engineers facilitated the implementation and internalization of Honda’s 
continuous improvement techniques and philosophies at Rover.  
Personal relations and the accompanying trust embedded in social networks were 
important means by which Rover acquired and shared tacit knowledge. Company visits and 
boundary-spanning individuals encouraged socialization, allowing tacit knowledge to be 
acquired through experience (cf. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Habitual routines were 
redesigned in order to integrate Honda practices. Some of the integration mechanisms 
involved staff dedicated to the development of the collaboration, enabling co-ordination 
through lateral communication and negotiation rather than hierarchy. Furthermore, inter-
personal, inter-firm networks were used for co-ordination and integration (cf. Grandori and 
Soda, 1995). Nevertheless, the interpretation and use of Honda practices were far from 
smooth. It was difficult to break ‘method[s that were] embedded in individual expression’ 
(manufacturing integration manager at Rover). Doing so necessitated intensive training. There 
was a high level of training in quality skills and the car development system at Rover. Direct 
involvement with the Japanese and emphasis on training by local management were two 
means of avoiding the ‘watering down’ of Honda practices. However, the diffusion of know-
how from Honda to Rover was not as smooth as that to Honda’s wholly-owned subsidiary in 
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the US. This was partly the result of issues of commercial confidentiality. Thus, while Rover 
engineers could be shown the assembly line or order of tasks for a given process, they could 
not receive any information on measurements or dimensions. Honda felt that such information 
was too sensitive to be disclosed to technical collaborators, for the two companies were 
competing in the same markets.   
Both Nissera UK and Rover-Honda invested considerable effort in diffusing tacit and 
explicit components of continuous improvement schemes by providing financial resources 
and employing high numbers of Japanese expatriates in the early years of operation. The 
cases indicate that tacit philosophies like ‘team spirit’ were more difficult for the UK 
workforce to internalize than explicit techniques like team-based structures.  
The key company and organizational characteristics that have an impact on the 
diffusion process across the three firms are summarized in table 4. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover--Honda Collaboration in the automotive industry 
exemplify the way in which firms draw only selectively upon production practices associated 
with the ‘Japanese model’. Compromise solutions are common in which only explicit aspects 
of the Japanese model are adopted (cf. Delbridge, 1998), and conflicting institutional legacies 
hinder the diffusability of work systems. The brownfield site displayed a relatively low 
degree of implementation as well as low internalization of Japanese work systems. By 
contrast, the greenfield and technical collaboration sites had a high degree of implementation 
and medium level of internalization owing to the availability of more financial and human 
(i.e. Japanese expatriate) resources, direct and high involvement by Japanese management, 
exercising direct personal/cultural control and providing hands-on training, longer period in 
operation and higher skills levels (see table 4). 
The findings highlight the structural and processual limits to the diffusion of Japanese 
work systems. The diffusion process is examined in relation to, first, the institutional 
embeddedness of work systems at national and local level, and second, the embeddedness of 
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tacit aspects of work systems at the firm level. [OK? Yes, this is fine.] The original meaning 
of Japanese source firms’ practices is difficult for UK adopter firms to understand. Where 
practices could be easily codified or structured into a set of identifiable rules and procedures, 
such as the gebba-kai problem-solving technique (as opposed to the gebba-kai philosophy), 
they could be diffused relatively easily to a different institutional setting. But in the case of 
hard-to-articulate tacit practices, it was more difficult to implement and internalize work 
systems in a similar manner to the source company.  
The paper shows the following influences on work systems diffusion: the 
characteristics of the adopter firm; the nature of the diffused work systems; and the 
institutional context to which the work systems belong. At the firm level, the highly context-
dependent Japanese work systems can be blended and redesigned upon their diffusion to a 
different national business system. At the national level, those work systems that are close to 
institutional norms and practices of the adopter firms may be more widely diffused. In 
contrast to isomorphism and convergence arguments (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
adopter firms do not necessarily mimic a particular work system that they consider highly 
effective and efficient. Firms attempt locally to interpret diffused work systems rather than 
submit to environmental pressures towards isomorphism. Incompatibility in institutionalized 
patterns of operating is not shaped by technical efficiency criteria alone. 
The case-study findings contribute to the debate on the divergence of capitalist 
systems (e.g. Campbell et al., 1991; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997); they do not support the 
argument that convergence is taking place in response to the pressures of globalization. At the 
same time, the study differs from existing observations in the literature on neo-
institutionalism in that empirical evidence is provided on different regional institutional 
systems within the UK. There is ‘persistent differentiation’ when local institutional 
differences and the role of actors at the firm level are taken into consideration. 
The generalization of findings to other sectors of manufacturing or to the service 
sector should be approached with caution. If the meanings attached to the use of Japanese 
work systems can vary across sites within the same sector, then differences can be expected 
between different manufacturing sectors. However, the salient organizational characteristics 
identified in the study as explanatory factors -- particularly the interplay of actors, resources 
and the nature of the diffused practices -- may be expected to have wider applicability.  
The institutional gap between the source and the adopter firm observed in this study 
can influence the pattern of diffusion to Japanese affiliate firms in other business systems. For 
example, employment stability, the acquisition of skills through heavy investments in 
training, and long-term strategic planning characteristic of the German business system might 
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be expected to present less of a challenge to the diffusion of Japanese work systems. 
However, there are also institutional constraints to such transfer within the German system, 
not least the ability of unions and powerful works councils to influence work practice 
innovation. For example, Dore (2000) argues that in the 1990s, despite the growing pressures 
on German firms to cut costs, there was strong resistance from German unions both to 
‘teamwork’, which would blur the connection between individual effort and reward, and to 
any unpaid worker contribution, through mechanisms such as ‘quality circles’, to the firm’s 
prosperity (see also Streeck, 1997).  
With continuing national institutional diversity, variations in the implementation and 
internalization of Japanese work systems between source and adopter firms can be expected 
to persist. However, the impact of national institutional diversity on the diffusion of work 
systems needs to be considered in conjunction with local institutional diversity and 
organizational initiative. For instance, in institutional contexts where there is a strong 
emphasis on non-unionism and performance-based pay systems, as in the USA, the level of 
industrial disputes would not be expected to explain local variations in the implementation 
and internalization of Japanese work systems. The reshaping of alternative work systems in a 
new institutional setting rests on differences between practices that are embedded in distinct 
local and national contexts, as well as organizational factors such as workforce 
characteristics, financial stability and managerial emphasis on the nature of diffused work 
systems.  
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Figure 1.    Implementation and Internalization of Japanese Work Systems 
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Source: Adapted from Kostova (1999) 
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Internalization of diffused work systems  
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Table 1.  Data Collection at Case-study Companies 
 
 Teniki (UK) Nissera (UK) Rover--Honda  
R8/YY Project 
Interviews in the UK 18 (Aug 1998--Jan 
2000) 
14 (Apr--Sep 1999) 25 (Jan--Sep 1999) 
Interviews in Japan 2 (April 2000) 6 (April 2000) 8 (March--April 2000) 
Total interviews 20 20 33 
Factory work 
experience (in the 
UK) 
1 week as operator 
in air element, air 
cleaner and carbon 
canister assembly 
(July 1999) 
1 week as operator in 
cluster assembly and 
PCB manufacture 
(June 1999) 
 ---- 
Factory tours in Japan Saitama plant; air 
cleaner assembly, 
injection and blow 
moulding and press 
shops (April 2000) 
LCD production, case 
assembly, R&D 
Centre (April 2000) 
[Tour of Rover’s 
Longbridge plant 
(June 1999)] 
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Table 2. Nature of Diffused Work Systems in Case-Study Companies 
 
  Teniki UK Nissera UK Rover--Honda 
R8/YY Project 
Nature of  
diffused 
work 
systems 
*Participation 
through teams 
Shift to team 
structure in 
1999 
Shift to team 
structure in 1997 
Shift to team 
structure in 1985 
* Commitment to 
continuous 
improvement 
schemes 
Low  Medium  Low till 
1985/Medium till 
1989/High 
thereafter  
*Degree of 
involvement by 
Japanese  
Impersonal/ 
technocratic 
through output 
control  
Personal/cultural  
through direct 
supervision and 
expatriate control 
Personal/cultural 
through 
socialization, 
informal 
communication 
and management 
training 
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Table 3. Key National and Local Institutional Characteristics  
 
  Teniki UK Nissera UK Rover--Honda 
R8/YY Project 
National 
institutional 
context 
Institutional gap between compartmentalized UK business system and 
highly co-ordinated Japanese business system  
Variation in emphasis on tacit and explicit work systems between Japan 
and UK 
Local 
institutional 
Context 
Location:   Site 
                   
 
                  Area 
Brownfield  
 
 
Centre for 
tourism 
Greenfield 
 
 
Centre for 
manufacturing 
Traditional 
home of 
Britain’s car 
manufacturing 
base  
Skills base Low in 
manufacturing 
High in 
manufacturing 
Medium in 
engineering* 
Inward 
investment 
Low High High 
Level of 
industrial 
conflict 
(working days 
lost per 1,000 
employees) 
Low High High 
* Perceived level in comparison to that of Honda. 
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Table 4. Key Company and Organizational Characteristics 
 
 Teniki UK Nissera UK Rover--Honda 
R8/YY Project 
Size (in 1999) Medium 
(170 employees) 
Medium 
(300 employees) 
Large  
(~39,000 employees) 
Age (year of acquisition 
or establishment)  
1996-9  1988-99  1978-89  
Nature of work Assembly of carbon 
canister, 
air intake systems  
(Factory workers) 
Assembly of vehicle 
instrument clusters 
(Factory workers) 
Automobile design, 
engineering and 
manufacture 
(Professional 
engineers) 
Form of ownership Subsidiary, 57% of 
parent-company shares 
held by Japanese car 
manufacturer 
Subsidiary Technical 
collaboration, 20% 
mutual shareholding 
arrangement in 1990  
Financial orientation Short-term  Long-term  Long-term  
Number of Japanese 
expatriates and roles in 
the UK 
4 (MD is British) 
Advisory role 
12 (including MD) 
Mainly director role 
Regular visits by 
Honda engineers 
(1986-9), liaison office 
established in 1985 
Advisory role 
Workforce skills level  Low Medium Medium [compared 
with Honda] 
Nature of and emphasis 
on training 
Hands-off,  
Low 
Hands-on, 
High (until 
1997)/Medium 
thereafter 
Hands-on, 
High in quality skills 
and car development 
system 
Degree of Japanese 
involvement  
High, indirect High, direct High, direct 
Nature of diffused work 
systems 
Emphasis on explicit 
practices (i.e. shift to 
team structure)  
Emphasis on both tacit 
and explicit practices 
Emphasis on both tacit 
and explicit practices 
 
 
 
